Institutions in comparative policy research

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The Asymmetry of European Integration - or why the EU cannot be a Social Market Economy

Judge-made law has played a crucial role in the process of European integration. In the vertical dimension, it has greatly reduced the range of autonomous policy choices in the member states, and it has helped to expand the reach of European competences. At the same time, however, Integration through Law does have a liberalizing and deregulatory impact on the socio-economic regimes of EU member states. This effect is generally compatible with the status quo in Liberal Market Economies, but it tends to undermine the institutions and policy legacies of Continental and Scandinavian Social Market Economies. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, this structural asymmetry cannot be corrected through political action at the European level.social policy; integration theory; law; competences; Europeanization; Europeanization

No exit from the joint decision trap? Can German federalism reform itself?

The unique institutions that make up Germany's unitary federal state, long considered part of the country's post-war success story, are now generally perceived as a joint-decision trap impeding effective policy responses to new economic and demographic challenges at both levels of government. Nevertheless, a high-powered bicameral Commission set up in the fall of 2003 failed to reach agreement on constitutional reforms. The paper analyzes the misguided procedural and substantive choices that led to this failure, and it discusses the possibility of asymmetric constitutional solutions that might enhance the capacity for autonomous action at both levels. -- Die im internationalen Vergleich einmaligen Institutionen des unitarischen Bundesstaats erschienen lange as Element der deutschen Erfolgsgeschichte in der Nachkriegszeit. Heute erscheinen sie jedoch als Politikverflechtungsfalle, welche die Politik in Bund und Ländern an der Bewältigung der neuen ökonomischen und demographischen Herausforderungen hindert. Trotzdem gelang es einer im Herbst 2003 eingesetzten und politisch potent besetzten gemeinsamen Kommission von Bundestag und Bundesrat nicht, sich auf eine Verfassungsreform zu einigen. Der Text analysiert die prozeduralen und sachlichen Fehlentscheidungen, die das Scheitern erklären, und er erörtert die Möglichkeit asymmetrischer Lösungen, die den Spielraum für autonomes politisches Handeln auf beiden staatlichen Ebenen erweitern könnten.

or why the EU cannot be a "Social Market Economy"

Judge-made law has played a crucial role in the process of European integration. In the vertical dimension, it has greatly reduced the range of autonomous policy choices in the member states, and it has helped to expand the reach of European competences. At the same time, however, “Integration through Law” does have a liberalizing and deregulatory impact on the socio- economic regimes of EU member states. This effect is generally compatible with the status quo in “Liberal Market Economies”, but it tends to undermine the institutions and policy legacies of Continental and Scandinavian “Social Market Economies”. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, this structural asymmetry cannot be corrected through political action at the European level

Political legitimacy in a non-optimal currency area

1\. Introduction 5 2\. Performance of the Original Euro Regime 6 2.1 Centralized Monetary Policy in a Non-optimal Currency Area 7 2.2 Euro Crisis and Euro-rescue Policies 10 3\. The New Regime of Euro Governance 12 3.1 Revised Problem Perceptions and their Implications 13 3.2 From Soft Recommendations to Hardened Requirements 13 3.3 What if the New Regime Had Been in Place? 15 4\. The Euro Regime: What is Gained and What Was Lost? 17 4.1 Limited Gains 18 4.2 Instead of Nominal Devaluation, Competitive Real Devaluation 18 4.3 Obstacles to the Management of Aggregate Demand 19 4.4 Global Capitalism and Self-inflicted Helplessness 20 4.5 But Could the Regime be Patched? 20 5\. Input Legitimacy of the Present Euro Regime? 24 6\. Could Political Union Provide the Solution? 26 6.1 The Risk of Politicization 26 6.2 Legitimate Majority Rule? 28 References 30On the basis of a brief reconstruction of the causes and impacts of the Euro crisis, this paper explores, counterfactually and hypothetically, whether the new Euro regime, insisting on fiscal austerity and supply-side reforms, could have prevented the rise of the crisis or is able to deal with its disastrous economic and social impact. A comparison with the likely impact of transfer- based Keynesian reflation suggests that, in both cases, economic success is uncertain, while both approaches are likely to produce severely negative sideeffects. In light of such dismal policy choices, attempts to politicize European election campaigns are more likely to provoke unmanageable policy conflict than to overcome the input-oriented, democratic deficit of European economic governance

No exit from the joint decision trap? Can German federalism reform itself?

"Die im internationalen Vergleich einmaligen Institutionen des "unitarischen Bundesstaats" erschienen lange as Element der deutschen Erfolgsgeschichte in der Nachkriegszeit. Heute erscheinen sie jedoch als "Politikverflechtungsfalle," welche die Politik in Bund und Ländern an der Bewältigung der neuen ökonomischen und demographischen Herausforderungen hindert. Trotzdem gelang es einer im Herbst 2003 eingesetzten und politisch potent besetzten gemeinsamen Kommission von Bundestag und Bundesrat nicht, sich auf eine Verfassungsreform zu einigen. Der Text analysiert die prozeduralen und sachlichen Fehlentscheidungen, die das Scheitern erklären, und er erörtert die Möglichkeit asymmetrischer Lösungen, die den Spielraum für autonomes politisches Handeln auf beiden staatlichen Ebenen erweitern könnten." [Autorenreferat]"The unique institutions that make up Germany's "unitary federal state," long considered part of the country's post-war success story, are now generally perceived as a "joint-decision trap" impeding effective policy responses to new economic and demographic challenges at both levels of government. Nevertheless, a high-powered bicameral Commission set up in the fall of 2003 failed to reach agreement on constitutional reforms. The paper analyzes the misguided procedural and substantive choices that led to this failure, and it discusses the possibility of asymmetric constitutional solutions that might enhance the capacity for autonomous action at both levels." [author's abstract

Reflections on multilevel legitimacy

"Legitimität hat die Funktion, die freiwillige Befolgung unwillkommener Autoritätsakte zu sichern. Da das Europarecht fast vollständig von den Mitgliedstaaten und ihren Gerichten umgesetzt und durchgesetzt werden muss, kommt es nicht zu einer unmittelbaren Konfrontation der EU mit ihren Bürgern. Deshalb sollte auch die Legitimität des Regierens in Europa als Zweistufen-Konzept diskutiert werden. Auf der einen Ebene bestimmt die Legitimität der Mitgliedstaaten die Reaktion der Bürger auf unwillkommene Regeln oder Entscheidungen, ohne dass es dafür auf deren internationale, europäische oder nationale Herkunft ankäme. Dagegen entscheidet die Legitimität der EU als „government of governments“ darüber, ob die Mitgliedstaaten ihrerseits ihre europäischen Verpfl ichtungen freiwillig erfüllen. Anlass zu Besorgnis gibt allenfalls die Rückwirkung des europäischen Regierens – insbesondere der von politisch nicht verantwortlichen Instanzen defi nierten negativen Integration – auf die Legitimität der Mitgliedstaaten und letztlich auf deren Fähigkeit zur loyalen Umsetzung europäischer Regeln." [Autorenreferat]"The function of legitimacy is to ensure voluntary compliance with unwelcome exercises of governing authority. Since practically all European law needs to be implemented and enforced by the governments and courts of the member states, the EU does not have to face its citizens directly. It follows that the legitimacy of European governance ought to be conceptualized at two levels. At one level, the legitimacy of member states is decisive for the compliance of individuals and fi rms, regardless of the ultimate origin – international, European or national – of the rules that demand this compliance. At the other level, the legitimacy of the European “government of governments” is decisive for the voluntary compliance of member states with the obligations imposed on them by the EU. What should be worrying however is the impact which EU governance – especially the rules of negative integration defi ned by politically non-accountable actors – may have on the legitimacy of member states, and ultimately on their capacity to comply." [author's abstract

Institutions in comparative policy research

Der Verfasser betrachtet die Rolle von Institutionen im politischen Prozess aus der Perspektive einer interaktionsorientierten Politikwissenschaft. Aus dieser Sicht sind die Akteure und ihre Interaktionen die primären Determinanten politischer Prozesse, während die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen auf die Entscheidungen der Akteure einwirken. Der Einfluss institutioneller Bedingungen auf politische Entscheidungen hängt damit von zwei nicht-institutionellen Faktoren ab - von den Fragen oder Problemen, auf die die Politik reagieren soll, sowie von den normativen und kognitiven Orientierungen der politischen Akteure. Der Verfasser fragt aus dieser Perspektive nach den politisch relevanten Effekten institutioneller Anreize auf das organisierte Eigeninteresse kollektiver Akteure. Abschließend werden Forschungsperspektiven für den Bereich der vergleichenden Politikforschung formuliert. (ICE

Political legitimacy in a non-optimal currency area

On the basis of a brief reconstruction of the causes and impacts of the Euro crisis, this paper explores, counterfactually and hypothetically, whether the new Euro regime, insisting on fiscal austerity and supply-side reforms, could have prevented the rise of the crisis or is able to deal with its disastrous economic and social impact. A comparison with the likely impact of transfer-based Keynesian reflation suggests that, in both cases, economic success is uncertain, while both approaches are likely to produce severely negative sideeffects. In light of such dismal policy choices, attempts to politicize European election campaigns are more likely to provoke unmanageable policy conflict than to overcome the input-oriented, democratic deficit of European economic governance

What have we learned? Problem-solving capacity of the multilevel European polity

"Aus Anlass der Evaluierung des Max-Planck-Instituts für Gesellschaftsforschung entwickelt dieses Working Paper einen Bezugsrahmen, in dem die Ergebnisse der am Institut betriebenen Forschung zur europäischen Mehrebenenpolitik im Kontext der internationalen Literatur eingeordnet und diskutiert werden können. Der Bezugsrahmen verbindet eine institutionelle Dimension (in der zwischen supranationalen, verflochtenen und intergouvernementalen Interaktionsformen unterschieden wird) mit einer Policy-Dimension (in der zwischen marktschaffenden, marktfördernden, markt-korrigierenden und redistributiven Policy-Typen unterschieden wird). Da Interaktionsformen sich in ihrer Konfliktregelungskapazität, und da Policy-Typen sich in ihrer Konfliktwahrscheinlichkeit unterscheiden, kann die größere oder geringere Problemlösungsfähigkeit in einem bestimmten Politikfeld durch dessen Lage in beiden Dimensionen erklärt werden." [Autorenreferat]"This Working Paper is an attempt, occasioned by the evaluation of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, to provide a conceptual framework within which institute research on multi-level European problem solving could be discussed in the context of a more comprehensive overview of the literature. The framework combines an institutional dimension (distinguishing between supranational, joint-decision and intergovernmental modes of EU policy making) and a policy dimension (distinguishing between market-creating, market-enabling, market-correcting and redistributive policies). As institutional modes differ in their capacity for conflict resolution, and as policy types differ in the likelihood of severe policy conflict, greater or lesser problem-solving capacity can be explained by the location of a particular policy area on both of these dimensions." [author's abstract